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Proposals have been made both within Congress and
the Executive Branch to alter the structure of the
military non- disability retirement system. The
advocates of change, for differing reasons, view with
alarm the rapidly increasing cost cf military
retirement. Each suggests an alternative by which the
government will be able tc control the growth iD
military retirement costs. However, these proposals
require a reduction in the value of the annuity to be
paid to future retirees. Ad income redistribution
alternative is presented which would reduce the annual
cost while retaining for future retirees a present
value of retirement income equal to or exceeding that
provided by the existing retirement system. It was
concluded that the complexity and political
sensitivity of the military retirement issue precludes
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Senator Thomas Eagleton postulates that, unless action
is taken to control the growth of military pension costs,
"in future years the classic guestion of economic priorities
could become 'guns or pensions 1 [ Aspin 1976]." While there
is little likelihood that the government will ever be faced
with such a narrow choice, the Senator 1 s statement does
reflect the growing concern of Presidents, members of
Congress and the leadership of the, Department of Defense
over the rapidly increasing cost of military non-disatility
retirement benefits. This thesis will examime the military
retirement system and explore alternatives to current
practices.
A. BACKGROUND
During fiscal year 1964, the cost of military retired
pay was $1.2 billion. By fiscal year 1978, the annual cost
will have risen to $9.8 billion and the Department of
Defense estimates that under the current retirement sjstem,
the annual cost of military retirement will be $34 billion
ty the year 2000 [ Military Posture 1976}.
Under the present regulations governing military
retirement, a service member may retire after twenty years
of service and receive a lifetime annuity equal to fifty
percent of active duty base pay at the time of retirement.
In addition to the annuity, which is adjusted to reflect
increases in the Consumer Price Index, the retiree and his
dependents retain the privilege to use the military
commissaries and retail stores and remain eligible to

receive free medical care at military facilities.
Military retirement benefits have been the subject of
in-depth studies conducted by the Defense Manpower
CommissioD (1976), the Inter-Agency Committee on Military
Eetirement (1971) , and the First (1967) and Third (1976)
Quadrennial Reviews of Military Compensation. All of these
studies have recommended changes to the military
non-disability retirement system. No major action has been
taken to date to implement the changes recommended by these
various study groups. Most recently, President Carter has
appointed a Blue-Ribbon Committee to study the entire
structure of military pay and benefits and has directed the
committee tc submit their findings and recommendations to
him by 15 March 1978.
E. STATEMENT OP THE PROBLEM
How much should military retirees receive in pension
payments and other fringe benefits? How long should a
serviceman be required to serve in order tc qualify for a
pension? Dees the military retirement sjstem provide
excessive bnenfits for the service rendered? Is military
compensaticn comparable to that received for similar work in
private industry? If so, should retirement benefits also be
comparable? Should the current system be changed?
These guestions and the answers proposed by those
involved form the basis for the current debate between the
proponents of change and supporters of the status guo.
Rhile the debate rages, most frequently in an emotionally
charged atmesphere, it is apparent that the question is no
longer "if" the current system will be changed , but rather
"when" such changes will be legislated and what form such
changes will take.
fiepresentaive Les Aspin is not a voice in the wilderness
in his determination to force a change. While his voice is
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most often heard and quoted, he stands in the company of
Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Generals and Admirals
who have also recommended change to current practices.
During the current session of the Ninety-Fifth Congress, a
proposal by Representative Aspin, in which military
retirement benefits would be computed under the less liberal
formula used for members of Congress, was defeated 247-148.
Under the Congressional system, members contribute eight
percent cf their salaries in return for an annuity payable
at age sixty-two. That the proposal was defeated is
immaterial; that 148 members voted in favor of the Aspin
resolution is evidence that there is a growing interest in
the subject within Congress and that the time may be at hand
when serious action will be taken to reform the laws
governing retirement from the military.
C. THESIS OEJECTIVES
The validity of the proposition that military
non-disatility retirement benefits are excessive will not be
tested in this thesis. The underlying assumption in this
effort is that, rightly or wrongly, the current system will
be changed in an effort to reduce the cost of military
retirement. It is only in this manner that the author has
the opportunity to avoid the emotional, and sometimes
irrational, arguments of those debating the merits or
liabilities cf change. By avoiding the emotion, it is hoped
that this effort results in an objective review of the
current system, the rationale offered in support of change
and an analysis of the impact of the various proposals upon
efforts to reduce the cost of military retirement.
As a means of comparison of the relative value of
benefits paid to military retirees, a review cf the benefits
payable to employees of industry, commerce and the
non-military public sector will be presented. Judgments on
11

the relative generosity of the military system will be left
to the reader.
In addition to a review of current and proposed
retirement formulae, the thesis will present an alternative
based upon the concept of income redistribution. Under such
a method it is demonstrated that significant reductions in
the annual cost of military retirement can be achieved while
ensuring that future retirees continue to receive, in a
present value sense, benefits equalling or exceeding those
currently payable.
Finally, the thesis will examine alternatives to the
current pay and benefits structure which would provide an
economic incentive to remain on active duty beyond
twenty-two years of serivce. It is beyond this point under
the current system in which there exists an economic
disincentive for continued service.
D. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: THE TIME VALUE OF MONEY
Explicit in the financial analysis conducted in the
development of this thesis is the recognition of the time
value of money. Simply stated, a sum of money received
today is worth more than that same sum of money received at
some future date. Stated another way, money has value
directly related to the timing of its receipt or
disbursement, and this value is determined by the
opportunity to earn a profit from a normal investment
[Helfert 1977],
The Department of Defense recognizes the time value of
money and its relationship with government expenditures.
"Economic Analysis and Program Evaluation for Resource
Management", a Department instruction, states
12

interest will be treated as a ccst which is
related to all government expenditures....
This policy is based on the premise that nc
public investment should be undertaken
without explicitly considering the
alternative use of the funds which it absorbs
or displaces.
The Department has adopted a discount rate policy which
reflects private sector investment opportunities foregone.
Currently, a ten percent rate is judged to be representative
and is applied to all economic analysis performed within the
Department.
The concept of the time value of money is best
explained with an illustration: $1,000 invested today with
a ten percent annual return will grow to $1,100 one year
from now. If this investment were delayed one year, an
opportunity to earn $100 would be lost. Conversely, if an
investor wished to have $1,000 one year in the future, an
investment of $909 today would provide the desired amount at
the ten percent rate.
Comparisons shown in this thesis reflect the use of a
ten percent rate of time preference or disccunt rate. While
it could be argued that the rate is higher cr lower, for
consistency with current Department of Defense practices,
the ten percent rate is used.
S. INFLATION
The income redistribution alternative presented in a
later chapter assumes that there will be neither inflation
nor pay increases in the future. These assumptions are made
in order to simplify the presentation and analysis of the
alternative and they are identical to the methods employed
by both the Department of Defense and Representative Aspin
13

in their proposals to alter the military retirement sjstem.
The use of "constant dollars" provides a common and
convenient base upon which to judge the competing
alternatives. Hhile these assumptions simplify the analytic
argument, they in no way prejudice the outcome or alter the
conclusions which may te reached.
14

II. HISTORY OF SHE NON^DISABILITY RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Prior to the Civil War there were no previsions in the
law for non-disability retirement from the military
services. Typically, officers in the rank of Colonel and
Lieutenant Colonel were over the age of sixty-five and it
was not uncommon to encounter Captains over the age of
sixty. Similar conditions existed within all of the
services. Since there were no provisions for compulsory
separation and thus no limit upon the length of active
service, an officer could remain on active doty until death,
despite incapacity because of old age.
At the outset of the war, Congress enacted a retirement
law designed to remove from service those officers who,
after a long career, were no longer fit for duty in the
field because of advanced age. The law, "An Act for the
Better Organization of the Military Establishnent"
,
permitted voluntary retirement after forty years of service,
with a pension equal to the pay of the officer's grade plus
a ration allowance. While the purpose of this first
non-disability retirement law was to make the military
services more efficient in time of war, the law contained a
provision which limited the number of such retirees to seven
percent of the authorized number of active officers. This
restriction effectively prevented the services from
achieving the desired effect of eliminating superannuated
officers from the active rolls. While the law had no
significant impact upon the number of aged officers, it
represented the first occasion in which the Congress and a
President recognized a need to provide a system in which
those no longer capable of performing their military duties
because of advanced age could be removed from active
service. In addition, for the first time, service in the
15

military would be, in itself, sufficient justification for
the payment of a pension. With isolated exceptions,
pensions had previously been payable only tc those disabled
as a result of military service or to the survivors cf those
killed while in the line of duty.
In 1870, the Congress extended the provisions cf the
earlier non-disability retirement law by authorizing
voluntary retirement of Army officers after thirty years of
service. Retired pay was fixed at seventy-five percent of
the pay of the officer's grade. These same provisions were
extended to Army enlisted personnel in 1885 and to the Navy
in 1899. fietained however were provisions which limited the
number of officers who cculd be placed on the retired list.
The limitations placed upon the number of retirees
caused stagnation in the Navy officer corps ; twice pricr to
Horld War II, stagnation forced changes in the
non-disability retirement laws. The first change, in 1916,
established selection boards for promotion to the ranks of
Commander, Captain and Rear Admiral in the Navy and
authorized retirement of those officers failing selection.
Hetirement pay was based upon the rate of twc and one-half
percent cf pay per year of service, tc a maximum of
seventy-five percent. This marked the first time that
length of service was considered in the computation of
retired pay.
Again in 1938, the Navy was troubled by prottotion
stagnation. In order to alleviate the problem, the Congress
extended the selection board process to all grades above
Lieutenant (junior grade) and placed limitations upon the
maximum years of service for officers in the grades cf of
Lieutenant Ccmmander through Captain. Most significantly,
the Congress, for. the first time, permitted voluntary
retirement after only twenty years of service [Defense
Manpower Commission' ].
By the end of World War II the regulations governing
retirement from the military were extremely complex, a
16

result of eighty-five years of "patchwork" legislation
designed to cure specific problems which had arisen in each
of the services. As a result, there existed different
requirements and benefits associated with non-disafcility
retirement. These varied both between the Army and Navy as
well as between officer and enlisted. The Officer Personnel
Act of 1947 placed the Army and Air Force under a selection
process for officers similar to that in effect in the Navy.
Id addition, the Army and Air Force Vitalization Act of 1948
enacted standardizied retirement laws for all services, in
which twenty years of service was prescribed as the minimum
requirement for voluntary retirement.
The provisions of the Vitalization Act remain
essentially unchanged today. However, as a result of the
Servicemen's and Veterans' Survivor Benefits Act of 1956,
members of the armed forces were provided coverage under the
Social Security System. While the principal reason for
providing this coverage was to improve the benefits payable
to the families of those killed while serving in the armed
forces, it also provides the retired serviceman who survives
to old age the benefit of a second pension which is tctally
additive to that received by virtue of his military service.
Today, the Vitalization Act and the social security
provisions of the Serivceman's and Veteran's survivor
Benefits Act are under close scrutiny by Congress and the
President as each attempts to develop an alternative system
which will satisfy the dual goals of providing a fair and
equitable pension benefit to the retired serviceman while
retarding the growth of military pension costs.
17

III. THE PROS AND CONS OF CHANGE
While there are numerous peripheral issues surrounding
the debate over the military non- disability retirement
system, the principal area of concern is the basic
retirement formula in which a serviceman can retire after
twenty years of service. In return for this career of
military service, the retiree is entitled to a lifetime
annuity egual to two and one-half percent of his final base
pay multiplied by the number of years of service tc a
maximum cf seventy-five percent. Figures 1 and 2 list the
retired pay for those retiring between 1 October 1976 and 30
September 1977.
A. THE CASE FOE CHANGE
The two arguments cited most freguently by proponents of
change to the military retirement system are that military
retirement benefits are excessively liberal and that the
cost of maintaining retirement benefits at current levels is
so great that it is having a pernicious impact upon Defense
capabilities. Either the taxpayers are paying more than is
necessary or the increasing cost of military pensions is
siphoning off funds needed to maintain an adequate level of
military preparedness. In either case, the goal of the
critics is to reduce the annual cost of military retirement.
In the paragraphs which follow, various factors which
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The end of conscription and the introduction cf the
all-volunteer concept ushered in a new era in military
compensation. If the military services were to compete in
the marketplace for manpower, they would be required to
offer compensation comparable to that available to private
sector employees. As a consequence, siqnificant increases
have been registered in the level of compensation provided
to military personnel and the government believes that this
compensation is now competitive with that available in the
in the private sector.
Since military retired pay is directly linked to
active duty Eay, these increases in active duty pay have
also spawned similar increases in the size of military
pensions. In 1965, a Commander retiring after twenty years
of service received an annuity of $5,600; during fiscal year
1977, a Commander retiring with the same length of service
received nearly $12,000.
Prior to the advent of the all-volunteer force,
active duty compensation was significantly below that
available to persons of similar background in the private
sector, while the military retirement sjstem provided a
benefit superior to nearly all segments cf the private
sector. It was percieved that the relative generosity of
the retirement benefit balanced the depressed active service
compensation. Under todays conditions of service, those
serving in the military are paid at a level comparable to
the private sector, but the liberal retirement formula
remains unchanged. The Department of Defense has suggested
If military personnel are to be the
recipients of active duty pay competitive




As stated in a previous section, money has value
directly related to the timing of its receipt. It is this
factor of timing which makes the military retirement system
so much superior to other retirement systems. For example,
a Commander retiring during fiscal year 1977 after twenty
years of service received an annual pension of $11,892.
From an assumed age of 43 to actuarial mortality at age 73,
this pension has a present value at time of retirement of
$112,096. For the majority of Americans who must wait until
at least age 62 to qualify for a full pension, an annual
pension of $105,550 from age 62 to age 73 wculd be reguired
to egual the present value of the Commander's pension
payable at age 43.
While the above illustration may not be intuitively
appealing to those not familiar with the concept of "present
value", it demonstrates in a dramatic fashion the impact of
timing upon the value cf money. Judicious investment of all
or a pcrticn of this retirement benefit provides the
military retiree with the opportunity to further increase
the value of his pension.
A comparison between military retirement benefits and
those paid to employees of selected corporations and members
of selected labor unions is provided in figure 3. As shown,
the military retiree enjoys advantages both in the age at
which he can retire and the size of his annual pension. In
addition, few private plans currently adjust pensions to
reflect increases in the cost of living. (A more complete
summary of private pension plans can be found in The Digest
2.1 Selected Eension Plans , a publication of the O.S.
Department of Labor) . From the standpoint cf comparability,
it is clear that the nilitary retirement system is more
generous than nearly all other retirement systems in the
United States; a review of available information indicates
that only in those occupations in which there is a high risk
of serious injury or death do retirement benefits




Normal Retirement Age: 65
Benefit Formula: The average of the highest salary for three years times
1.5% times years of service.
Minimum benefit? $120 x years of service.
Remarks: Plan is non-contributory; benefit is integrated with
Social Security.
Eastern Air Line
Normal Retirement Age: 62-65
Benefit Formula: Average of highest three years times \.W/a times years
of service.
Minimum benefit: $144 x years of service.
Remarks: Non-contributory; no integration.
Uriited Steelworkers of America
(Agreement with United States Steel)
Normal Retirement Age: 65
Benefit Formula: Average monthly earnings for the highest five consecutive
years from among the last ten years times J3%, plus 1.2^
times years of service in excess of thirty years.
Minimum benefit: $352.50 plus $14 x years in excess of
thirty
.
Remarks: Non-contributory; benefit cannot exceed the amount of
Social Security received by the retiree.
Ford Motor Company
(Salaried Employees)
Normal Retirement Age: 65
Benefit Formula: Years of service times $10. Factor varies with salary
scale.
Remarks: Non-contributory; no integration.
Teamsters
(Central States, Southeast and Southwest States)
Normal Retirement Age: 60
Benefit Formula: $550 per month. Requires twenty years of service.
Remarks: Non-contributory.
Figure 3 - SELECTED PENSION ELANS
23

2- 3he Cost of Military Pensions
As stated previously, During fiscal year 1964 the
cost of military retired pay was $1.2 billion. By fiscal
year 1978, the annual cost will rise to $9.8 tillion and the
Department cf Defense estimates that under the current
retirement system, the annual cost of military retirement
will be $34 tillion by the year 2000.
In its report to the President in 1970, the Elue
Bibbon Defense Panel estimated the annual ccst of military
retirement in the year 2000 to be only $12.8 billion. Since
the time of their report two factors have combined to change
radically the rate of increase in retired pay: first, the
compensation provided to military personnel has been
increased dramatically from artificially depressed levels to
a level of comparability with the private sector; seccnd,
the cost cf living has risen at an unprecedented rate during
the 1970 , s. Since the annual cost of retired pay is a
function of both active duty pay and adjustments to reflect
increases in the cost of living, increases in either cause
corresponding increases in retired pay.
Senator Thomas Eagleton has recently warned that
Anerican taxpayers are sitting on top of a
"financial time bomb" in the form cf unfunded
pension plans for military personnel and
?owernment civilians at local, state and
ederal levels Navy Times January 26,
1976].
Grouping all public employee pensions together,
Representative Les Aspin raises the specter of the federal
government being forced to choose between defaulting on its
obligations or increasing taxes, the choice faced ty the
City of New York [ Harpers December, 1976]. While such a
situation can and does exist at the state and local level,
to imply that the federal government faces a similar crisis
is to exaggerate greatly potential problems facing
24

Washington. Since few of New York's creditors are also
residents of the city, the creditors are able to escape the
taxing powers of local government. However, at the federal
level, only a small fraction cf the public debt is in the
form of ctligations to non-residents of the United States;
thus, if required, citizens may be taxed to pay the
government's obligations to other citizens. In the federal
situation, such taxation represents a redistribution of
income among citizens, while the same situaticn at the state
or local level represents a transfer from within the
community to creditors outside the system.
In the discussion over the cost of military retirement,
the problem is not one of economics, but rather a prcblem of
the realities of politics. Given that both the Congress and
the President desire to restrain growth in the cost of
government, choices must be made among programs competing
for scarce dollars. It is the opinion cf Representative
Aspin and many military leaders that military retirement
benefits are not of sufficient priority to warrant continued
unbridled growth. While their reasoning in support of
change to the laws governing military retirement may be
different, their goal is the same: to reduce the annual
cost .
For military leaders, the increasing cost of manpower,
including military retirement, has an adverse impact upon
Defense capabilities. In his annual report to the Congress
for fiscal year 1977, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld
stated
we must slow the growth of defense manpower
costs to ensure an adequate level of
resources for procurement, research and
development, maintenance and operations.
Retired pay represents an uncontrollable outlay, an expense
which must be paid whatever the impact upon other programs.
These payments result in no direct contributicn to current
25

or future military preparedness, and during pericds of
fiscal austerity can drain needed funds frcm support of the
active forces. Military leaders recognize that there is a
finite limit to the size of the Defense budget both in terms
of the amount a President will request and the amount which
a Congress will appropriate. If Congress or the Presidenr
desires to hold the line on overall Defense spending while
manpower costs continue to rise, there will be fewer funds
available to operate, maintain and equip the active fcrces.
This situation currently exists and faced with the choice
between "guns or pensions", the Department of Defense fcas no
alternative tut to place its highest priority upon those
programs directly supporting the defense capabilities cf the
military services.
3- Changing lime s
Veterans of World War II picture comtat as a brute
strength confrontation between opposing armies of foot
soldiers on the plains of Europe or the jungles of the South
Pacific in which artillery and bombers played only secondary
roles in support of the foot soldier. In those days
physical strength and vigor, key elements cf youth, were a
basic requirement if armies were to be victorious in the
field and it was appropriate to retire from active service
those no longer possessing these qualities. Today, while
the foot soldier retains a prominent role in the success of
a combat force, around him has grown a new military force
based upon a technology in which mental prowess, not
physical strength, is the dominant characteristic. The
demands upon these two segments of the armed forces - the
technician and the foot soldier - are radically different
and it has been suggested by the Defense Manpower Commission
that the military retirement system be altered to reflect
these differences. In today's highly technical environment,
the Commission found that
26

the high cost of specialized training and
the importance of skills and insights
developed only through experience have made
forced high turnover through early retirement
an expensive and disruptive practice for many
military occupations.
In order to alleviate this problem, the Commission made
the following recommendations on the determination of
retirement eligibility:
A normal military career should be a minimum
of thirty years, but should allow for
continued service as great as forty years in
some occupations and early retirement with as
few as twenty years in other occupations,
primarily those combat jobs requiring
considerable youth and vigor. Assuming a
full career of thirty years, eligibility for
retirement on an immediate annuity would
require thirty 'retirement points 1 .... Everyjob would be assigned an incentive multiplier
according tc its mission, with a minimum of
one and a maximum value of one and one-half.
Most non-combat jobs could be assigned an
incentive multiplier of one, while a rifleman
in an infantry rifle company, for example,
would be assigned the maximum.
B. THE CASE AGAINST CHANGE
As stated at the outset of this paper, it is assumed
that the retirement system will be changed. The purpose of
this section is to call attention to factors which should be
considered in the development of an alternate benefit
structure. Those responsible for developing this new
structure would be well advised to consider the advice
contained in the following bit of Americana philosophy:
"There 1 s no such thing as a free lunch."
Critics of the military retirement system base their
arguments in favor of change upon their belief that the
benefits paid to military retirees are overly generous when
compared to ether retirement systems. One cannot refute the
premise -that the system is generous, but unanswered is the
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question of how much the military system must offer if the
services are to attract and retain personnel in sufficient
guantity and quality to meet the manpower requirements of
national defense. Before action is taken to alter the
retirement benefits structure, this guestion must be
addressed. The nilitary can ill afford to be placed in a
position in which the benefits it can offer *in the
marketplace are deemed inadequate by potential employees.
In the paragraphs which follow, possible impediments to
change will ke discussed.
1. Competition in the labo r Marketplace
When the President, with the consent of the
Congress, decided that the military's manpower requirements
would no longer be met through the practice of conscription,
there was created a requirement for military service to
provide a level of compensation sufficient to attract
potential employees in the labor marketplace.
The government has adopted the concept of "pay
comparability" in an effort to provide government employees,
both civilian and military, with a level of pay and benefits
competitive with those available in the private sector for
similar occupations. While the Civil Service appears able
to satisfy its manpower requirements under this practice,
the military services continue to experience difficulties
recruiting sufficient numbers of qualified employees to
satisfy all requirements. If this has been the case when
the military enjoys one of the most liberal retirement
systems in American society, one can only speculate en the
potential manpower problems which may be encountered if the
retirement benefit is reduced to a level of comparability
with the private sector.
Historically, a career in the military, particularly
the enlisted career, has never been percieved by our society
as an attractive alternative to employment in more
traditional occupations. In the private sector, in order to
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attract people to the less desirable but essential
occupations, employers are required to offer premium
compensation rates. Construction workers, bus drivers and
sanitation workers, among others, require little education
or formal training, yet command these premium wages. Eolice
and firemen, as well as others in high risk occupations, are
paid a premium for their risk taking. If the military pay
structure is to be competitive and comparable in the labor
market, it may be necessary to provide the serviceman with a
premium to compensate for risk, where applicable, and for
the perception that military service is an undesirable
alternative to civilian employment.
The high cost of military retirement may be the
premium which must be paid if the services are to be
successful in their competition with the private sector for
employees.
2. Conditions of Serv ice
The introduction of the all-volunteer concept, and
the attendant requirement for the military to compete in the
labor marketplace for required manpower, has brought into
focus the variances between the demands of private sector
employers and those of the military employer.
The government claim that its military employees are
paid at levels comparable to those in the private sector
must now stand the test of close scrutiny by potential
employees. In the past, family separation, long working
hours and dangerous working conditions were considered "part
of the job" and, under most conditions, not worthy of
payment of a premium. Under current retirement laws, it can
be logically argued that the relative generosity of the
military pension adequately compensates for these less
desirable conditions. But what will happen when the
retirement system is changed so that it is more comparable
with the private sector?
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It follows that if military compensation is to be
truly comparable, then the government should be prepared to
provide premium wages to those required tc perform duties
beyond the societal norm. As examples, servicemen should
expect, and may demand, payment for all overtime work, for
all periods of forced family separation and for work
performed under dangerous conditions or in an inhospitable
environment.
As noted in the previous section, the high ccst of
Military retirement may be the premium required to
compensate fcr the conditions of service. if the retirement
laws are made less liberal, then new forms cf compensation
will be required. Before decisions are made on alterations
to the retirement laws, the costs of these new premium
payments must be weighed against the potential savings in
retirement. The pay and benefits structure of the military
is extremely complex and before attempting to change one
factor, such as retirement, one must consider the impact of
such adjustments upon "the entire system. It is evident that
neither the Department of Defense nor representative Aspin
has considered the impact of their proposals to change the
laws governing retirement. The Blue Ribbon Committee
appointed bv President Carter has been tasked to review the
entire pay and benefits structure, but it is unlikely that,
in the three months remaining before they must report to the




IV. DEFECTS IN THE MILITARY COMPENSATION SYSTEM
The military compensation system, while providing
generous benefits to those who serve to retirement
eligibility, is plagued by numerous defects which detract
from the overall effectiveness of the system. In the
paragraphs which follow, two principal defects will be
reviewed and alternatives to current practices will be
offered. While neither of these problems directly impacts
upon the cost of military retirement benefits, each may
influence the individual serviceman^ retirement decision.
Because of this reason, it is appropriate that these
deficiencies be included in . a discussion of retirement
modernization.
A. SERVICE BEYOND RETIREMENT ELIGIBILITY
A principal concern of many members of Congress is the
tendency of most flag and general officers to leave the
service prior to the statutory retirement age [ Navy Times
May 23, 1977]. What is rarely considered is the fact that
there is no economic incentive for career servicemen, be
they admirals or petty officers, to remain on active duty
beyond the point of maximum return in terms cf the present
value of their retirement income. As depicted in figure 4,
for both officers and enlisted personnel, the present value
of this income declines after twenty-two years of service.
One could argue, in the case of officers, that there are
adeguate, although non-economic, incentives for many to
remain beyond twenty-two years. In the Navy, it is at this
point and beyond that the "successful" naval officer reaps
the rewards of sustained superior performance with
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prestigious assignments such as command of capital ships,
command of major shore activities and positions of
significant responsibility in headquarters staffs. It may
be that such non-economic incentives are adequate to retain
sufficient numbers of quality senior officers, at least
until the noD-economic incentives dissipate. However, there
are few "prestigious" assignments for senior enlisted
personnel. The lack of non-economic incentives is reflected
in the retention profile presented in figure 5, which shows
that only 1.1 percent of enlisted personnel entering the
service will remain on active duty for twenty-five years,
versus 13.4 percent fcr officers [ Congressional Eudget
Office 1977].
Beyond twenty- two years, the active duty pay schedule
provides only one increase for years of service. This
increase, for service beyond twenty-six years, is modest and
for the serviceman contemplating a thirty year career, it
provides an average annual increase during this eight year
period of 1.4 percent for an E-8 and less than 1.1 percent
for an 0-6. In terms of either real dollars or the present
value of military compensation, there is simply no economic
incentive to remain on active duty. Given the choice of
remaining at a personal economic loss or leaving the service
at an early age to pursue a second career, the overwhelming
majority choose the latter alternative.
If the services desire to retain greater numbers of
officers and enlisted personnel for full careers (thirty or
more years) , economic incentives to remain on active duty
must be offered. The Retirement Modernization act,
described in Chapter V, has proposed a negative incentive by
penalizing the retiree for leaving prior to the completion
of thirty years active service; similar provisions have been
offered by the Defense Manpower Commission. While such
approaches might provide the desired effect in the long
term, the problem exists today and it should be met Kith a
solution which will provide more immediate results.
32

As an alternative to current practice, the military
services should propose a change to the military
compensation system by which basic pay rates would be
increased for each two years of service beyond twenty years,
to a maximum at thirty years. Accompanying such a change
would be a requirement for the services to identify those
officers and enlisted personnel who should be invited to
remain on active duty beyond retirement eligibility. Both
past performance and future potential value to the services
would be considered in the screening process, a practice
currently observed in the Navy's continuation screening for
Flag Officers. In this manner, the services could select
those whose continued presence will be most beneficial to
its needs and they will be able to provide the needed
economic incentive to the individuals so selected. Such a
program would improve the services both by retaining many
more of the competent servicemen who currently retire at the
earliest possible date and by retiring at the earliest
possible date those marginal performers who currently remain
beyond the point of continued useful service.
B. CEILINGS UPON MILITARY PAY
Implicit in the structure of all federal pay schedules
is a ceiling which cannot exceed the salary payable to
members cf the Congress. Such an artificial limitation is
counter-productive
,
particularly in the military services,
where retirenent is possible after as few as twenty years of
service. While there have been efforts to ensure that the
pay of most lower level employees is generally comparable to
that available in the private sector, the pay of senior
officials has been depressed in order that it remains below
that of Congress. As a consequence, senior military
officers and civil servants are asked to remain in
government service at a real economic loss and to pass up
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the opportunity to participate in a second career in which
the remuneration, for positions similar to those held in the
federal service, far exceeds that currently available within
the government. Many state and local governments have long
recognized the need to decouple the salaries paid to
non-elected executives from those of elected
representatives. In order to attract and retain qualified
executives, the federal government must offer compensation
competitive with the private sector. The cost of such a
change wculd be insignificant, but the potential for
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- 1§E WASHINGTON ALTERNATIVES
In this chapter, three alternatives to the current
military retirement system will be reviewed. The first, the
Uniformed Services Retirement Modernization Act, has been
proposed by the Department of Defense. The Defense Manpower
Commission, in its report to the President, has offered an
alternative rot significantly different in concept from that
proposed in the Retirement Modernization Act. The third
proposal, authored by Representative Les Aspin, is a much
more radical departure from the current practice; so much so
that it is highly unlikely that his proposal will ever
receive serious attention in its present form. However, his
proposal is consistent with the pension plans offered by
most private corporations and for this reason it should not
be ignored.
The reader is cautioned that neither the Defense
Department proposal nor that of the Defense Manpower
Commission is unique, for each has its genesis in the
recommendations contained in the Interagency Committee*s
1971 report to the President on their study of the lilitary
retirement system. In nearly every instance, the
recommendations contained in these two current proposals
differ only in an incremental manner from the original
recommendations of the 1971 report.
Absent from all three is an assessment of the potential
impact of a reduction in the value of military retirement
benefits upon the ability of the services to attract and
retain the required number of quality volunteers. In an era
in which the available manpower pool is shrinking, it is of
paramount importance that any proposal to change a component
of the military compensation system include an analysis of
the impact of the change upon recruitment and retention.
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A. THE RETIREMENT MODERNIZATION ACT
The Retirement Modernization Act contains little
original thought on the subject of militarj retirement; it
simply represents the sum of the Defense Department 1 s
incremental adjustments to the earlier recommendations of
the Interagency Committee. Rather than attempt to develop a
new approach to the problems associated with the rapidly
increasing ccst of military retirement, perhaps because of
time limitations, the general concepts presented in the
Interagency Committee report were accepted as the baseline
by the DoD Study Group [ DoD Retirement Study Group 1972].
The recommendations of the Defense Department have been
translated into proposed legislation which has been
presented to the Congress annually since 1972. Despite
objections ty members of Ccngress and the Defense Manpower
Ccmmissicn to some of the Defense Department proposals, it
remains essentially unchanged since it was first described
to the Hcuse Armed Services Committee in hearings conducted
in October, 1972. Again in 1977, the legislation had been
prepared for submission. However, submission has been
deferred pending Presidential review of a new Blue Bibbon
Committee^ study of the entire military compensation
system. It appears unlikely that any proposal to change the
military retirement system will be submitted by the
Executive Branch to Congress before 1979. The prospects for
change are discussed in Chapter VII.
1 • £Ei2cip,al Changes
a. Incentives for Continued Service
Dnder the existing system, the retirement
annuity is computed by multiplying the retire€»s final basic
pay times a factor equal to 2 1/2 percent for each year of
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service. Under the Retirement Modernization Act, this
multiplier factor will be increased from 2 1/2 percent to 3
percent for service beyond twenty-four years. The maximum
payment will be raised from seventy-five percent for thirty
years of service to a new maximum of seventy-eight percent.
b. Beduced Annuity Payments
Those servicemen serving in excess of twenty
years, but less than thirty years, will have their annuity
multiplier reduced by fifteen percent. This reduction will
remain in effect until their years of service plus their
years on the retired list total thirty years or until the
member becomes sixty years of age. As an example, a retiree
with twenty years of service will have his multiplier
reduced from 50 to 35 percent for a period of ten years. In
terms of the effect of this multiplier reduction's impact
upon the dollar value of the annuity received, the twenty
year retiree will have his annuity reduced by thirty percent
for a ten year period. For the servicemen retiring after
twenty-eight years of service, this reduction equates to a
twenty-one percent reduction in the monetary value cf the
annuity fcr a period of two years.
c. Social Security Integration
When a retiree receives any social security eld
age insurance benefit, his annuity will be reduced by
one-half of the social security benefit which is
attributable to the period of his military service. The use
of an offset is a common practice in the private sector and
reflects the employer's contribution to the social security
benefit. In effect, the use of an offset provision
compensates the employer for the requirement to pay one





The annuity of a retiree will te computed from
the average amount of tasic pay received during the twelve
month period of highest earnings. With few exceptions, this
period is represented by the final twelve months of service.
Under existing statutes, the annuity is computed frcm the
tasic pay rate in effect upon the date of retirement.
e. Vesting
Under the current system, a serviceman must
serve until he is eligible for retirement before qualifying
for some sort of pension. No existing private pension plans
are so restrictive in their vesting requirements. The
Retirement Modernization Act would provide for vesting of a
pro rata share of retirement benefits for voluntary and
involuntary separation before retirement eligibility. For
members involuntarily separated, they wculd qualify for
inclusion after completion of five years of service. Those
who voluntarily leave the service would qualify after ten
years.
2 - Estimated Savings
Because the new retirement system wculd be phased in
over a period of approximately twenty years, there will be
no near term savings. The Department cf Defense had
estimated a cumulative savings of $10.6 billion through the
year 2000. The estimate assumed an effective date of
October, 1977 so that if implementation were delayed until
1979, the cumulative savings would be reduced to
approximately $8 billion through the year 2000.
B. THE DEFENSE MANPOWER COMMISSION
Created by an Act of Congress, the Defense Manpower
U0

Commission was charged to conduct a broad and comprehensive
study and investigation of the overall manpower requirements
of the Department of Defense. A principal concern of those
who supported the creation of the Commission was and remains
the rising cost of military manpower [ Defense Manpower
Commission 1976 ]. In the two years of its existence, the
Commission conducted a comprehensive study of all aspects of
Defense manpower and produced a superior report for the
President and Congress to use as a background for future
deliberations over the future course of military manpower
planning and costs. The Commission's recommendations for
changes to the current retirement system are detailed in the
Commission staff study entitled New Initiativ es fcr the
Military Estate Progra m .
1 - Principal Change s
a. Retirement Eligibility
The Commission recommends that a normal military
career be a minimum of thirty years, but shculd allow for
continued service for as long as forty years in some
occupations and early retirement with as few as twenty years
in those occupations requiring youth and vigcr.
In order to qualify for an immediate annuity, a
serviceman would be required to acquire thirty "retirement
points." Occupations would be assigned an "incentive
multiplier" based upon the type of mission, with a minimum
value of 1 to a maximum of 1.5. Non-combat positions would
receive the minimum multiplier while certain combat
positions would be assigned the maximum. Each day of active
duty would earn retirement points equal to 1/365 times the
"incentive multiplier. "
b. Annuity Base
The annuity of a retiree would be computed from
the average amount of basic pay received during the highest
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three year period. For most retirees this will be
represented by the final three years of service.
c. Computation of Eetired Pay
Ihe Commission offered for consideration a
retirement multiplier equal to 2 2/3 percent for each
retirement feint earned to a maximum of eighty percent for
thirty retirement points. Although retirement would be
permitted at any time after thirty retirement points are
earned, thirty years of service would be reguired to receive
an immediate, unreduced annuity. If less than thirty years
of service has been performed, the retiree could choose
between an actuarally reduced annuity upcn retirement or
could defer receipt of the annuity until the date when he
would have completed thirty years.
d. Social Security Integration
Under the Commission's proposal, there would be
nc explicit integration of retired pay and Social Security
benefits. However, they suggest that the value of these
benefits be considered when a determination is made of the
appropriate levels of retirement multipliers.
e. Vesting
The Commission recommends that vesting rights be
granted only to those members who serve for a minimum of ten
years. A serviceman voluntarily separated would receive a
deferred annuity; those involuntarily separated would
receive an immediate cash payment for readjustment plus the
choice between a deferred annuity or a second cash pajment.
2- Estimated Savings
The Defense Manpower Commission did not estimate the
potential savings associated with their recommended changes.
It would appear however that adoption of this proposal would
provide savings in excess of these offered by the Retirement
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Modernization Act because of the requirement to acquire
thirty retirement points. Since few, if any, spend their
entire career in combat positions, the time required to
qualify for an immediate annuity (full or reduced) will
exceed twenty years. Consequently, the number of years in
which annuity payments will be made to a serviceman will be
reduced.
C. REPRESENTATIVE LES ASPIN
Representative Aspics proposal to change the military
retirement sjstem is contained in H.R. 15775, entitled the
"Uniformed Services Nondisability Retired Pay Reform Act."
This bill was submitted to the second session of the
Ninety-Fourth Congress. While no action was taken on this
bill before adjournment, there is every reason to believe
that it will be resubmitted in its present form in the
future. A step-by-step comparison with the other two
alternatives is provided in Guns or Pensions , his study on
the military retirement system. His principal argumect in
support cf change is his belief that the military retirement
system is excessively generous.
1 • Principal C hanges
a. Vesting
Onder this proposal, all personnel would be
eligible for a deferred annuity after completion of five
years of service.
b-. Qualifying Age for Pensions
lor those personnel who leave active service
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between five and nineteen years of service, payment would
commence at age sixty-two. The eligibility age is reduced
to sixty for those with twenty to twenty-nine years of
service and at fifty-five for those with thirty or more
years.
c. Annuity Base
The proposed base is the average Regular
Military Compensation received during the highest three
years. Regular Military Compensation is defined as the sum
of basic pay, guarters allowance, subsistence, allowance and
the tax advantage of the two allowances. The use of this
base is related to Representative Aspin*s efforts, reflected
in other proposed legislation, to have military compensation
provided in the form of a salary with all allowances and
basic pay combined into a single pay item.
d. Computation of Retired Pay
The benefit formula would provide 1.25 percent
for each of the first five years, 1.75 percent for service
between six and ten years and 2 percent for each year teyond
ten. The total of these percentages would te multiplied by
the average Regular Military Coapensation to provide the
monthly benefit payable to the retiree.
e. Social Security Integration
At the present time, the proposal does not
include recommendations for integration. However, from the
information provided in the Aspin study, such a provision
may be included in the future.
f. Contributcry Retirement
The Aspin proposal would require contributions
to a retirement fund by both the serviceman and the
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services. The serviceaan«s contribution would be phased in
over an undefined period cf years, rising to a maximum of
seven percent of Regular Military Compensation.
2« Estimated Savings
At Eepresentative Aspin 1 s reguest, the Defense
Department estimated the savings if all future retirees
received a deferred annuity at age sixty for twenty to
twenty-nine years of service and at age fifty-five for
thirty years of service. According to the Departffent f s
estimate, the Aspin proposal would result in savings in
excess of $110 billion by the year 2000 as compared tc a
cumulative savings of $10.6 billion under the Retirement
Modernization Act [ Military Posture 1977 ].
D. SUMMARY
While each proposal addresses many of the defects in the
current system and offers solutions to these problems, the
principal gcal of each is to reduce the annual cost of
military retirement. the most liberal formula is contained
in the Eepartment of Defense proposal, but even this
alternative would result in a reduction in the amount cf the
retirement annuity for all but those serving for a thirty
year career. Neither the Department of Defense proposal nor
that of the Defense Manpower Commission provides an adequate
economic incentive for service beyond twenty-two years
because the present value of these benefits continues to
decline beyond this point. The proposal by Representative
Les Aspin is designed sclely to reduce the cost of
retirement and contains no positive incentives for continued
service, only negative ones. In Chapter VI, an alternative
will be presented which would, if enacted, reduce the annual
45

cost of military retirement while preserving or enhancing
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VI. INCOME REDISTRIBUTION: A NEW APPROACH
While the proponents of change speak not only of
reducing the cost of military retirement but also of
improving manpower management, a review of available
literature en this topic clearly reveals that improved
manpower management is only a peripheral issue. These
critics view the rapidly rising costs of military pensions
either as a threat to the national economic welfare
(Representative Aspin) , or as a threat tc the military*s
ability tc carry out its mission because of the drain of
resources from programs directly supporting the defense of
the nation (Ihe Department of Defense)
.
The alternatives presented by both the Defense Manpower
Commission and the Department of Defense will provide long
term savings. However, the savings, while large, become
nearly insignificant when compared to the annual expense
which will be experienced at the time these savings
ultimately materialize. Lacking in all proposals, including
that of Representative Aspin, is a consideration of the
potential impact of a reduction in military retirement
benefits upon the ability of the services to attract and
retain guality personnel. As discussed in an earlier
chapter, a generous retirement beneift may be the premium
which must be paid to keep the ranks filled with adequate
numbers of guality personnel.
If the goal of the critics is, as it appears to be, a
reduction in the annual cost of military retirement, there
are an infinite variety of alternatives available which
could satisfy this objective without resulting in the
situation in which future retirees are worse off than their
predecessors. The alternative presented in this chapter
describes a proposal for income redistribution in which a
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reduction in the annual cost of military retirement can be
achieved without adversely iapacting upon the present value
of the annuity received by the retiree. The alternative
also proposes a soluticn to the difficulties encountered in
attracting personnel to remain in the service beyond the
retirement eligibility point.
A. ECONOMIC INDIFFERENCE
If a person is rational, in an economic sense, he will
be indifferent to the manner in which payments are made to
him, so long as the present value of the benefit received is
maintained at the desired level. The underlying assumption
in the development of this alternative is that military
personnel are rational and can be made indifferent to
changes in their future pension benefits. Ey preserving an
eguality between the present value of income streams under
the propcsed alternative and the present value of income




The concept of present value was discussed in Chapter I,
but because an understanding of the concept is so critical
to this presentation, it will be reviewed before proceeding
further.
The application of present value analysis to an economic
problem is no more than a recognition of the time value of
money; it is a straightforward concept which contains no
magic and is one which is encountered dailj in all sectors
of society. Simply stated, a sum of money received today is
worth more than that same sum of money received at seme
future date. Stated another way, money has value directly
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related to the timing of its receipt or disbursement, and
this value is determined by the opportunity tc earn a profit
from a nonal investment [ Helfert 1977], To illustrate,
$1.00 invested today would, with an annual return of ten
percent, be north $1.61 after five years; at ten percent, a
$1.00 return five years in the future would require only a
62 cent investment today.
Since neither Congress nor the Defense Department has
demonstrated an interest in ether than a reduction of annual
costs, paying a retiree $1.00 today rather than $1.61 five
years from now would satisfy their objective. Preserving
the present value of that future payment would satisfy the
objective of the economically rational retiree.
C. HHI INCOME REDISTRIBUTION?
1 • Benefit to the Indi vidual
Lester C. Thurow^ theory en the optimal
distribution of consumption expenditures, verified by
statistical analysis, states that the actual income
distribution ever a lifetime does not satisfy the desired
distribution of the recipient. The data presented by Thurow
shows that prior to age forty-seven, and beyond age seventy,
optimal income exceeds that actually received. In the
intervening years, income exceeds the optimum. Ihurow
suggests that alternatives can be developed which adjust
actual income patterns to the optimum levels suggested by
the data [ American Economic Review 1969 ]. The proposed
retirement alternative can satisfy the objective of income
redistribution.
The determination of the manner in which income
should be redistributed is based upon the author's judgment
of when, in the military career, the difference between
actual and desired income is at its maximum. From
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observation and personal experience, it is estimated that
this difference is maximized at two points during a career.
At approximately age thirty-three, the typical officer is
faced with a need for a large sum of money with which to
finance the purchase of a home. This money can be
representative of the down payment upon the first home
purchased or the large increment beyond current savings
required to enter the housing market in the high cost areas
such as Washington, D.C., Hawaii or California. The second
period of maximum need, which occurs near age forty, is
related tc the additional income required to finance the
higher education of his children.
Under this alternative, a portion of the money
currently received as retirement income can be provided at
those ages when the need is greatest. In return for the
redistribution of what would have been a portion of a
retirement pension tc these pre-retirement points, the
retirement annuity would be reduced a commensurate amount.
However, a strict equality wculd be maintained between the
present value of retirement inccme under the present system
and the present value cf the pre-retirement payments and
reduced retirement annuity under the alternative.
2- Eenefit to the Government
If, as previously discussed, the Congress and the
Department of Defense have as their goal the reduction of
the annual costs of military retirement, then the benefit to
them under this alternative is the achievement of such a




1 • Reduced Annuity
In consideration of the bonus payments descrited in
the next section, the annuity payable for completion of
twenty years of service will be reduced to thirty-five
percent of the annuity base. The annuity base could be
calculated from the average of the highest twelve mcnth
period, highest three years or from the basic pay on the
final day of service. The calculations to be presented
assume a continuation cf the current practice of computing
the annuity from the basic pay rates in effect on the last
day of service. Regardless of which annuity base is
selected, the redistribution alternative remains valid in
its achievement of the stated goal of reducing the annual
cost of military retirement.
2- ESSiJs Payments
The key factcr in the redistribution of retirement
income is the payment of bonuses in lieu of seme portion of
the future retirement annuity.
The first payment would be made during the eleventh
year of service. For officers, the bonus would be payable
only after selection for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant
Commander; for enlisted, upon incurring a contractural
obligation for cumulative service totaling sixteen years.
The second bonus would be payable during the
sixteenth year of service. For officers, failure to be
selected for promotion to Commander wuold require a
reduction in the size cf the second bonus to ensure that the
total present value of the lifetime benefit would not exceed
that currently paid. Similar criteria would be established
for enlisted personnel. The years during which bonus
payments would be made were selected arbitrarily by the
author. The exact timing of these payments is not critical
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to the proposal, although the timing does affect the amount
payable under this alternative because of the time value of
money. For illustrative purposes, payments were computed at
these twc career points.
Each bonus payment would be equal to cne-half cf the
present value of the reduction in the retirement annuity:
one-half of the difference between the value of the
retirement annuity under the current system (fifty percent
for twenty years of service) and its value under this
alternative (thirty-five percent for twenty years) . For
example, if the present value of the annuity reduction were
equal tc $1,000, the first bonus payment wculd be equal to
$500 while the second , assuming payment five years after
the first, would be equal to $805. The second bonus has
been increased at a ten percent rate to reflect the time
value of money over the five year period between payments.
This scheme will be illustrated in subsequent
sections cf this chapter.
3- Incentive s for Con t inued Service
In addition to the earlier stated recommendation
that the basic pay schedule be adjusted to provide increases
for each two years of service beyong twenty years, the
benefit formula would be changed to provide an increment of
three percent per year for each year beyond twenty years, to
a maximum of sixty-five percent after thirty years.
4 . Vesting
The alternatvie does not address the questicn of
changes in the laws governing when a servicemen acquires a
vested interest in the military retirement system. In a
present value context, the cost of vesting for those leaving
the service prior to attainment of retirement eligibility is




5. Ium£ Sum Eayments
Id addition to the savings potential offered by the
redistribution alternative, further savings could be
realized by the institution of a lump sum payment program.
Ihe value of this payment would, as with the bonuses, equal
the present value of the retirement annuity displaced.
Three illustrative examples will be presented in subsequent
sections of this chapter.
E. ASSOiiFTICNS
In preparing this alternative, a number of assumptions
were made to simplify the presentation of illustrations.
Ihere are, however, two assumptions whose validity is
critical to the alternative: economic indiffernce and the
rate of time preference.
1 • Economic In differen ce
Military personnel can be made economically
indifferent to changes in their future pension benefits if
the present value of future income streams under the
proposed alternative equals the present value of future
income streaos under the current system.
2- Rate of Time Preference
Ihe rate of time preference, the personal disccunt
rate, for both officers and enlisted is ten percent. One
could argue that the rate is higher for these whose current
income does cot egual desired levels, but the assumed rate
is consistent with that used within the Department of




Ibe illustrations assume no inflation. This
assumption is made only for ease in calculations and has no
impact upcn the validity of the concept under conditiors in
which inflation is present.
*• Ages and Banks
a. Officers
Calculations are based upon an assumed ace of
thirty-three upon completion cf ten years of service. The
officer will achieve the rank of Commander (0-5) within
twenty years of service. Failure to be selected for
promotion to Commander will result in a reduction in the
size of the second bonus, but the present value cf the
lifetime income stream for the rank achieved will be
maintained when compared to the present system.
b. Enlisted
Calculations are based upon an assumed age of
twenty-nine upcn completion cf ten years of service. The
enlisted retiree will achieve the grade of Chief Petty
Officer (E-7) within twenty years of service. Failure to be
selected for promotion to Chief Petty Officer will result in
the same type of reduction as that applied to officers.
Those prcmoted to E-8 or E-9 prior to the receipt of the
second bonus would have this payment enhanced to reflect the
increased value of their retirement income stream.
5 • iili Expectanc y
The life expectancy of the retiree is based upon
data reported in the Statistic al Abstract of the United
Statesj, 121§. • Computations are based upon the life
expectancy at the earliest retirement date.
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6- Betiree Distributi on
The calculations assume that 26.3 percent of the
retirees are officers and 73.7 percent enlisted. The
typical retiree is a Commander or a Chief Petty Officer with
twenty years of service.
7 « Betiree Population
The retiree population is assumed to rumber
1,300,000. (The estimated population for fiscal year 1978
is 1,221,000) .
F. SAfiPIE COMPUTATION
For this illustration, the sample serviceman is an
officer, age 33 who has been selected for promotion to
Lieutenant Commander. He will retire as a Commander upon
ccmpleticn cf twenty years cf service. He will be 43 years
old at retirement, with a life expectancy of thirty years.
1 • £urj:Jirt S yste m
- Final base pay: $1,981.80.
- Annuity: fifty percent of final base pay, $11,892
per annum.
- Total lifetime payments: $11,892 x 30 years =
$356,760.
Present value of lifetime income stream at a ten
percent disccunt rate, present value computed from age 33:




- Final base pay: $1,981.80.
- Annuity: thirty-five percent of final base pay,
$8,324 per annum.
Annuity reduction: $3,567.60 below current
system.
- Present value, of reduction, at age 33:
(9.779 - 6.145) x 3,567.60 = $12,965.
- Twc bonus payments to retain equality with the
present value of retirement inccme under the current sjstem.
The first payment, totalling $6,482, would be made during
the eleventh year of service; the second , $10,440, would be
made during the sixteenth year. The total cf these payments
represents the amount cf money which is reguired to maintain
the strict eguality between the old and new systems. The
differences in the size of the payments reflects the time
value of money for the five years between payments.
- Total lifetime payments: $6,482 + 10,440 + (8,324
x 30) = $266,642.
3 . Sayings
Total lifetime payments under the redistribution
alternative will egual $266,642, compared to $356,760 under
the current system. The redistribution alternative will
save $90,118 in terms of actual cash expenditures frcm the
Treasury. Order both systems, the present value of the
income stream is the same: $43,215. The redistribution
alternative is compared with the existing system in Figures




The income redistribution alternative cculd be phased in
over a period of ten years. When fully implemented, it
would provide annual savings of $2.4 billion. The estimate
is based upon the assumed retiree population and
distribution.
H. ADDITIONAL POTENTIAL SAVINGS
At the time of retirement, the gcvernaent could offer
the retiree lump sum options similar to the following:
A single payment equal to the present value cf the
annuity payable over the retirement lifetime.
A lump sum payment equal to a percentage cf the
present value of the annuity (e.g. 25 and 50 percent) plus a
reduced annuity.
1« Sajc.le Com putation s
for illustrative purposes, the retiree is assuiied to
be a forty-three year eld Commander with twenty years of
service. He is retiring under the income redistribution
scheme and has already received two bonus payments.
Note : The present value computations are made frcm his
current age to reflect the value of the net income stream on
the date cf his retirement.
a. Alternative 1
A lump sum payoff.
Present value of annuity at age 43: 9.427 x
8,324 = $78,470.
Potential savings: 249,720 - 78,470 = $171,250.
b. Alternative 2
Immediate payment of twenty-five percent of the
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annuity, with a reduced annuity payment.
Present value of twenty-five percent of the
annuity at age 43: 9.427 x 8,324 x 0.25 = $19,618.
Eeduced annuity: 6,243 x 30 = $187,290.
Potential savings: 249,720 - 187,290 - 19,618 =
$42,812.
c. Alternative 3
Immediate payment of fifty percent of the
annuity, with a reduced annuity payment.
Present value of fifty percent of the annuity at
age 43: 9.427 x 8,324 x 0.50 = $39,235.
Eeduced annuity: 4,162 x 30 = $124,860.
Potential savings: 249,720 - 124,860 - 39,235 =
$85,625.
I. THE ALTERNATIVES COMPARED
If , as has been assumed in this presentation, the goal
of those who desire to alter the current retirement formula
is to reduce the annual cost of military retirement, the
income redistribution alternative will provide the desired
results. If the goal of change is to reduce both the annual
cost and the present value costs of the retirement sjstem,




VII. THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
As stated at the outset, it is apparent that the
guestion is no longer "if" the current system will be
changed, but rather "when" such changes will be legislated
and what form such changes will take. However, one should
not assume that the changes to be legislated will be enacted
without significant controversy and resistance. Change is a
traumatic experience under the best of circumstances and
will always face resistance, most intensely from these who
feel most threatened by the change.
Two factors will significantly influence the debate over
the proposed alteration of the military retirement system.
On the economic side of the argument is the concern that the
rapidly rising cost of military retirement will have a
pernicious impact upon the government. Representative Aspin
and Senator Eagleton point toward an ever increasing turden
upon the taxpayers and the specter of increased taxes or
economic ruin, as was experienced by New York City. The
Department of Defense expresses concern over the diversion
of funds from programs which directly support the defense of
the nation in order to support retirement needs. On the
personnel side, there exists the possibility that , under an
all-volunteer system of military service, significant
reductions in the value of military retirement benefits may
adversely influence the decisions of prospective employees.
Unanswered at this time is one critical guestion: what
price must be paid if the services are to attract and retain
sufficient numbers of guality personnel?
In this chapter, these factors will be discussed as




Members cf Congress are concerned not only with the cost
and the cost trend of military retirement, but also with
those of the Social Security system and the Civil Service
retirement system. A Congressional staff member told the
author that the mood of the Congress has changed over the
past few years since the Retirement Modernization Act was
first submitted. He suggested that the time may be at hand
for serious Congressional action on the guesticn of
retirement costs. As evidence of the changed mood and
heightened interest, he cited the 1976 Congressional action
which eliminated the provisions in the various retirement
laws which had permitted cost of living adjustments to
exceed the actual increase by one percent. The "one percent
kicker" had been designed to compensate annuitants fcr the
delay between the rise in the cost of living and the receipt
of the adjusted annuity. The staff member cautioned that
Congressional action cculd be limited to a review of the
military retirement system with an emphasis upcn an
evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of the system
in fulfilling its goals.
The changes proposed are certain to produce conflict
because the issue is of direct interest to millions of
voters. The two million active servicemen and the 1.2
million retirees, plus their dependents and the lobbyists
who represent their interests will ensure that tremendous
pressure is brought to bear upon key members of Congress.
In an Air Force Times interview in 1975, Representative
Samuel S. Stratton acknowledged that modernization of the
non-disability retirement system is necessary, but stated
that he is reluctant to come to grips Kith the problem.
"I'm a little hesitant", he said, "... we will get a let of
flak on it as another reduction of benefits ...." These
remarks were in anticipation of pressure, not the result of
a lobbying effort by servicemen or special interest groups.
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Active advocates of change or supporters of the status
quo within the Congress are few and their positions are
reported in detail only in service oriented publications.
However, judging by the number of Congressmen who voted in
favor of Representative Aspics proposal to place the
military under the less genercus Congressional retirement
formula, there is sentiment favoring some modificaticn of
the existing laws.
A factor which will influence the timing of
Congressional action is the relative priority attached to
proposed legislaticn fcr retirement modernization. Since
President Carter has submitted, or will submit within the
next year, proposed legislation on the problems of ecergy,
government reorganization, tax reform and welfare reform, as
well as the Panama Canal Treaties, all of which are
extremely ccmplex issues of greater social and economic
importance to the nation, there appears little likelihood
that proposals to refcrm the military retirement system, if




It is the Department of Defense, more than any other
critic, which supports change in the methcd for computing
military retirement. under pressure frcm both Congress and
the President to retard the growth of military spending,
they face the dilemma postulated by Senator Eagleton: the
choice between guns or pensions. Previously cited was the
statement of then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that
the cost of manpower must be slowed if there is to be an
adequate level of resources available to support those
programs which contribute to the development, procurement,




While the Pentagon champions the Retirement
Modernization Act, it" appears that they will support any
reasonable attempt to control the growth of manpower costs,
particularly retirement costs. In a recent address to the
students at the Naval Postgraduate School, Vice Admiral
James D. Watkins, the Chief of Naval Personnel, spoke cf the
difficulties associated with the taking away or reduction of
benefits already in existence. As an alternative, he
suggested that schemes such as the recent practice of
diverting twenty-five percent of a cost of living pay
increase into the basic allowance for quarters could provide
the desired effect upon the growth in retirement costs
without causing an outcry from the servicemen affected.
Another alternative which had been used successfully on
occasion by Presidents Nixon and Ford is to recommend cost
of living raises which are below the actual increase in the
cost of living.
The amount of money available to the Department of
Defense is, and will continue to be, finitely United.
Charged with the responsibility to provide for the active
defense of the country, they will continue to support
efforts to limit the amount of resources allocated to those
who by reason of age are no longer active participants in
the defense effort.
The Department of Eefense could enhance the prospects
for change if they would develop proposals which could
satisfy the objectives of the Department, the President,
Congress and the military retiree. Income redistribution is
cne alternative which can satisfy the objectives of all
those who have an active interest in the subject of military
retirement. Regardless of the form which a proposal to
alter the nilitary retirement system takes, a simple and
straightforward alternative which avoids the conflict
generated by earlier proposals, is sensitive to the desires
of the retirees, and satisfies the goals of the Department
and others to reduce retirement costs would attract early
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action from the Congress. It is the Pentagon which controls
the fate of retirement modernization: a solid proposal can
be enacted without much debate
, a resubmission of the
fietirement Modernization Act in its current form will ensure
continued delay and perhaps failure.
C. THE PRESIDENT
While addressing the subject of military retirees being
eiployed by the federal government after retirement,
President Carter clearly stated his concern about the cost
of the military retirement system. He said:
We need to make sure that we cut dcwn on the
future costs of the retirement system in the
military. Quite often they are excessive and
I don't think it is right for the taxpayers
of our nation to have someone go into the
Army or Navy at the age of 21, serve 20
years, retire at the age of 41, draw a
substantial retirement and then get a full
time job working with the federal government
[ Navy Times April, 11, 1977].
His concern over the rising cost of military retirement
echoes the sentiments of his immediate predecessors.
President Carter has appointed a Blue Bibton Committee to
study all aspects of the military compensation system and
charged them to report their findings and recommendations to
him by 15 March 1978. If the report is submitted to him on
time, it is improbable that their review will have consisted
of anything more than a cursory review of the existing
system and the currently active recommendations for change.
Under these curcumstances, there will most certainly be
additional studies commissioned by the Defense Department.
As with the Congress, the President must decide upon
the relative priority of his legislative program. Proposals
to change the military retirement system will face stiff
opposition from special interest groups representing bcth
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the retiree and active duty populations. With so many major
problems demanding attention, he may choose to defer action
on the guestion of military retirement modernization until
much later in his term of office.
E. TIME FOB A CHANGE?
The President, the Defense Department and Congress view
retirement modernization as an idea whose time has ccme.
All are in agreement
,
yet no one can devise a formula upon
which all can agree. The First Quadrennial Review of
Military Compensation, the Interagency Committee, th€ DoD
Betirement Study Group, the Retirement Modernization Act,
the Defense Manpower Commissicn, the Third Quadrennial
Beview of Military Compensation, the Aspin proposals and now
the Blue Bibton Committee: military retirement may be the
subject receiving the most attention and least action in
Washington.
One reason for all of these studies is the conflict
between those who desire to save money and those who must
ensure that the services remain competitive in the labor
marketplace. No proposal which has yet been made can
guarantee satisfaction of both objectives. For all
proposals, the bottom line always equals a reduction iE the
value of ailitary retirement benefits for the future
retiree.
It may be time for a change, but change might best be
accomplished under a formula which both saves monej and
retains the value of the retirement benefit. Such a formula
is made possible by a Congress which measures the cost of
programs in terms of actual dollar expenditures rather than




A» SHCDID THE SYSTEM BE LESS GENEBOOS?
To the question "should the military retirement system
be less generous?", there is no easy answer. At this time
there are too many factors which remain unguantif ied, too
many doutts about the impact of such a change upon the
services 1 ability to attract employees from the labor
market. At the present time the services are experiencing
difficulty in filling their recruiting goals. The number of
men and women gualified to serve is declining and as the
population stabilizes, the competition with the non-military
sectors will become more intense.
Economically, the much touted "comparability" of
nilitary compensation with the private sector is not readily
visible to potential employees, particularly those who have
an opportunity for employment in the private sector. A
recent article on the employment opportunities available to
1977 high school graduates reported that in one Ohio
community, jany non- vocationally trained graduates were
finding employment with local companies at wages which range
from $3.50 to $4.40 per hour, while those with a vocational
background were being hired for positions paying in excess
of $6.00 per hour. One new employee had expressed an
interest in joining the military but decided against it
because employment opportunities, at higher wages, were
available in his community [ Hall Street Journal August 16,
1377]. An annual wage of $8,000 commands a lot of attention
68

from an eighteen year old , especially if the alternative is
a position in the military where an unmarried E-1 has a
gross salary, exclusive of benefits, of less than $4,500.
B. WILL THE SYSTEM BE CHANGED?
The final guesticn brings us back to the initial and
underlying assumption of this thesis. The system will be
changed; what remains to be decided is when such changes
will be inplemented and the form such changes will take.
Because the solution to the problem of military
retirement ccsts will be the result of a political decision,
there is little likelihood that the new order will be a
radical departure from current practice. Neither
Representative Aspics proposal, which would save in excess
of $100 billion by the year 2000, nor the redistribution
alternative, with its $30 billion savings over the same
period, are close enough to current practice to gain
widespread support, although each warrants study. Politics
is called "the art of compromise" and it is most likely that
the final product will appear as the middle ground between
opposing alternatives.
The more obvious inequities, such as enlisted personnel
of the Navy and Marine Corps receiving retirement credit for
early enlistments, will be eliminated and perhaps there will
be a change to an annuity based upon the average of the
final three years basic pay. However, after ten years of
studies and special commissions, the "new" retirement system
will most likely be only incrementally different frcm the
old. Mhen all the speeches have been made and all the words
written, we will be able to conclude that the entire episode
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